BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of : AT&T BROADBAND PHONE OF : UTAH, LLC for a Certificate of Public : Convenience and Necessity to :

Provide Switched and Dedicated, : Docket No. 01-2383-01

Resold and Facilities-Based Local: Exchange and Resold and Facilities: Based Interexchange Services with:

the State of Utah

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

THOMAS REGAN

ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES

06 January 2003

1 I. STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS AND INTRODUCTION

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- 4 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- 5 A. My name is Thomas M. Regan. My business address is 8625 Farmington Cemetery
- 6 Road, Pleasant Plains, Illinois, 62677.

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- **8 Q. WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT OCCUPATION?**
- 9 A. I am an Economist with the firm of William Dunkel and Associates. I have been
- employed by William Dunkel and Associates since 1994. Since that time, I have
- regularly provided professional consulting services in telephone regulatory
- 12 proceedings throughout the country.

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- 14 Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?
- 15 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (CCS).

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- 17 Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED AN APPENDIX THAT DESCRIBES YOUR
- 18 QUALIFICATIONS?
- 19 A. Yes. My qualifications are shown on Appendix A.

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- 21 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS
- 22 **PROCEEDING?**

- 1 A. In my Direct Testimony, I discuss the economic principle of oligopoly and the
- 2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), which is an economic tool used to evaluate the
- 3 level of competition that exists in a market.

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Q. WHEN IS A MARKET CONSIDERED TO HAVE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION?

- A. The exact level of competition where a market is considered to have effective
- 8 competition is difficult to determine. However, there are economic tools that can be
- 9 used to evaluate the level of competition that exists in a market. One of these tools
- is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"). In fact, the Utah Public Service
- 11 Commission's (Commission) 2002 Report to the Governor and the Legislature on the
- Status of Telecommunications Competition in Utah (2002 Report) indicates that the
- HHI is a tool that can be used to evaluate the level of competition in a market. Page
- 14 13 of the Commission's Report states:

Courts and federal agencies acknowledge the existence of market power when a firm has the ability and incentive to raise or maintain prices above competitive levels or to achieve other anticompetitive effects. Two economic measures used to evaluate market power are the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") and the Effective Firm Index. Both can be used to judge the level of competition in the industry.

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23 Q. HOW IS THE HHI CALCULATED, AND WHAT HHI IS NEEDED FOR THE

MARKET TO BE CONSIDERED COMPETITIVE?

- 25 A. The Commission's Report indicates that the HHI must be at .50 or below for the
- 26 market to begin to be considered somewhat competitive. Page 13 of the
- 27 Commission's Report states the following:
- 28 HHI measures market concentration by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and summing the results. The HHI increases as

the number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases. An index value of .50 is the necessary threshold value for the market to begin to be considered somewhat competitive. (emphasis added)

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6 Q. WHAT IS THE HHI FOR QWEST IN UTAH?

- 7 A. According to page 14 of the Commission's 2002 Report, Qwest's HHI for 2002 is
- 8 .853 for the overall residential market. Therefore, the overall residential market in
- 9 Utah has not "begun to be considered somewhat competitive" under the
- 10 Commission's standard.

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12 Q. IS THE HHI USED BY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO TEST FOR

THE PRESENCE OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION?

- 14 A. Yes. The HHI is commonly used for testing for the presence of effective
- 15 competition. The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
- use the HHI to measure market concentration. The larger the share of the market in
- the hands of fewer service providers in the market, the higher the market
- 18 concentration, and the higher the HHI. Those markets with higher concentration are
- generally perceived as being more susceptible to misuse of market power and anti-
- 20 competitive behavior.

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- 22 Q. DOES THE EXISTENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE SERVICE PROVIDER IN A
- 23 PARTICULAR AREA MEAN THAT THE AREA IS NECESSARILY EFFECTIVELY
- 24 **COMPETITIVE?**

- 1 A. No. I agree with the Commission's conclusion on page 11 of its 2002 Report to the
- 2 Governor and Legislature when it states, "It is not just the number of carriers in each
- 3 telecommunications market that defines competition, but also market shares and
- 4 perceived quality of service."

- The fact that two producers may not be sufficient to provide effective price
- 7 competition (especially where one has a large market share) is well known. This
- 8 situation is described in a standard economics textbook:

Oligopoly. Whether or not there is identity of products or some differentiation, if there are but two, three, or a few sellers, they may come to realize that their prices are closely interrelated. If Corporation A cuts its price, it can win much business from its rivals. It knows this. They know this. Is it reasonable for A to proceed on the assumption that its rivals will stand by passively while it takes away their business? Not really. A will guess, or may soon learn from experience, that when it cuts its price, its rivals tend to meet or to exceed such a price cut. Economic warfare may result, until the few sellers come to realize that they are in the same boat together.

Back in the old days before the antitrust laws were important, such oligopolists might have formed a merger, or a tight little cartel or trust. Meeting at celebrated dinners, such as those that Judge Gary of the United States Steel Company held decades ago, the sellers would collusively set some kind of a monopoly price. A full monopoly price? Sometimes, if they were sure they could keep newcomers out. But in the more realistic case where the oligopolists had to take account of the fact that setting a high price would tempt new rivals into their field, they would agree on a price higher than the purely competitive one but would moderate their charges for fear of new entry.

Today it would be illegal in the United States, and a few other countries, for cartels to set prices collusively and shamelessly to maximize their mutual profits. On the other hand, if a few large firms encounter the same problem, experience suggests that they may - without ever meeting, phoning, winking, or corresponding - arrive at a tacit mode of behavior that avoids fierce price competition. With or without a price leader, the sellers may be quoting rather similar prices - prices which come nowhere near the level of MC, as in the

	perfectly	competitive	industry	discussed	in	Chapter	22.1(citation
omitted). ¹							

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As the above excerpt from a standard economics textbook explains, "if there are but two, three, or a few sellers" in a market, the companies will soon learn that their prices are interrelated, and that price competition is simply not in their best interests.

When there is a dominant company like Qwest in a particular area, competitors generally will price its service based upon the dominant company's (i.e. Qwest's) price. This means that if Qwest increases its price, the competitors may increase their own prices. Both firms are better off, but the public is worse off. Because this is the nature of markets with few sellers, a maximum price is needed to protect the public from oligopolistic pricing behavior.

16 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

17 A. Yes.

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¹ Economics: An Introductory Analysis by Paul A. Samuelson, Sixth Edition, pp. 492-493.

Thomas M. Regan, Consultant 8625 Farmington Cemetery Road Pleasant Plains, IL 62677

PRESENT POSITION

William Dunkel and Associates

Position: Consultant

- Testified on behalf of the Maryland Office of the People's Counsel before the Maryland Public Service Commission in a Universal Service proceeding involving Verizon-Maryland, Case No. 8745.
- Testified on behalf of the Government and Consumers Intervenors (GCI) before the Illinois Commerce Commission in an Alternative Regulation case involving Ameritech Illinois, Docket No. 98-0252, in which I addressed economic principles.
- Filed testimony on behalf of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission in a subsidy case involving VALOR Communications, Case No. 3300, in which I addressed economic principles.
- Testified on behalf of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission Staff in a subsidy case involving Qwest Communications, Case No. 3325, in which I addressed economic principles.
- Filed testimony on behalf of the Staff of the Arizona Corporation Commission in a general rate case involving Qwest Communications, Docket No. T-01051B-99-0105, in which I addressed economic principles.
- Filed testimony on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate in a case involving Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Docket No. R-953409 in which he addressed stimulation as a result of toll price reductions.
- Testified on behalf of the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel in a rate rebalancing case involving U.S. West Communications, Inc., Docket No. 96S-257T et al.

- -Participated, but did not testify in, the following proceedings:
- -Missouri Docket No. TR-2001-65 (Cost of Access Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 02-JBNT-846-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 02-BLVT-377-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 02-S&TT-390-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 02-WLST-210-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 02-HOMT-209-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 01-CRKT-713-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 01-SFLT-879-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 01-BSST-878-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 01-PNRT-929-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -Kansas Docket No. 01-SNKT-544-AUD (Audit and General Rate Proceeding)
- -New Mexico Case No. 3223 (Universal service fund proceeding)
- -Arizona Docket No. T-00000A-00-0194 (Wholesale cost/UNE proceeding of Qwest)
- -Arizona TX 98-00716 (Tax Case of Citizens Telecommunications Company of White Mountain, et. al.)
- -Maryland Case No. 8862 (PIC change charge case of Verizon Maryland)
- -New Mexico Case No. 3008 (General Rate/Depreciation case of USWest)
- -Arizona Docket No. T-01051B-97-0689 (Depreciation case of US West)
- -Illinois Docket No. 99-0412 (EAS case involving Geneseo Telephone Company)
- -Kansas Docket No. 98-SWBT-677-GIT (State USF case involving SWBT)
- -Kansas Docket No. 00-UTDT-455-GIT (State USF case involving Sprint)
- -Arizona Docket No. T-02724A-00-0595 (Earnings Review of Table Top Telephone Co.)
- -Missouri Docket No. TO-98-329 (USF case involving SWBT)
- -Ohio Docket No. 97-1657-TP-UNC (Access charge case involving Ameritech Ohio)
- -Illinois Docket Nos. 98-0200/98-0537 (Consolidated) (Usage sensitive service of GTE)
- -Florida Undocketed Special Project (Fair and Reasonable Rates of BellSouth, GTE, and Sprint)
- -Pennsylvania Docket No. A-310125F002 (GTE North Interconnection Proceeding)
- -Washington Docket UT-960369 (US West Communications, Inc. Interconnection Case)
- -Utah Docket No. 97-049-08 (US West Communications, Inc. General Rate Case)
- -Oklahoma Cause No. PUD 96-0000214 (Public Service of Oklahoma Depreciation Case)

- -Hawaii Docket No. 7702 (GTE Hawaiian Tel General Rate Case)
- -Washington Docket UT-950200 (US West Communications, Inc. General Rate Case)
- -Pennsylvania Docket R-00953409 (Bell Atlantic Toll Automatic Savings Plan)
- -Pennsylvania Docket R-00963550 (Bell Atlantic Rate Rebalance Proceeding)
- -lowa Docket RPU-95-11 (US West Communications, Inc. General Rate Case
- Withdrawn by USWC just prior to hearings)
- -Arizona Docket E-1051-93-183 (US West Communications, Inc. General Rate Case Remand)
- -Colorado Docket 95S-523T (US West Communications, Inc. CustomChoice Case Withdrawn)
- -Utah Docket 95-049-05 (US West Communications, Inc. General Rate Case)
- -lowa Docket RPU-95-10 (US West Communications, Inc. Interconnection Case)
- -Hawaii Docket 94-0298 (General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) Depreciation Case)
- -Indiana Cause No. 39938 (Indianapolis Power and Light Company Depreciation Case)

Participation in the above proceedings included some or all of the following:

Developing analyses, writing draft testimony, preparing data requests, analyzing issues, analyzing economic costs and principles, price elasticity and other economic issues, writing draft testimonies, preparing data requests and responses, preparing draft questions for cross-examination, drafting briefs, and developing various quantitative and economic models

Member of the Economic Advisory Board at the University of Illinois-Springfield.

PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT

Sangamon State University Graduate Assistant

- -Prepared research projects on various economic topics
- -Formed theoretical and statistical models
- -Analyzed results of empirical models
- -Formulated policy recommendations based on results.
- -Worked with students

EDUCATION

Master of Arts in Economics from Sangamon State University in Springfield, Illinois GPA 3.97/4.0

Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts Economics from University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois Relevant Coursework:

-Mathematics and Calculus

-Statistical Analysis

-Accounting/Financial Analysis

-Economic and Statistical Modeling

-Economics in Management

-International Economics

-Environmental Economics

-Marketing

Academic Awards and Honors:

- -Phi Theta Kappa Honor Fraternity
- -Economics Marshall Award
- -Omicron Delta Epsilon Economics Honor Society
- -Who's Who at America's Colleges and Universities
- -Outstanding Student in Economics Award
- -Highest graduate GPA in history of Economics program